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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case requires us to determine the scope of federal 
preemption under the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”), 49 
U.S.C. § 20701.  Appellant Delaware & Hudson Railway 
Company, Inc., doing business as Canadian Pacific Railway, 
and its subsidiaries (collectively, with the parent company, 
“Canadian Pacific”) settled lawsuits brought by its employees 
who had suffered injuries as a result of defective train seats.  
Canadian Pacific then brought indemnification, contribution, 
and breach-of-contract claims against Knoedler 
Manufacturing, Inc. (“Knoedler”), which supplied the seats, 
and Durham Industrial Sales, Inc. (“Durham”), which tried 
unsuccessfully to repair the seats.  Upon motions filed by 
Knoedler and Durham (collectively the “Appellees”), the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed Canadian Pacific’s claims, holding 
that they were preempted by the LIA.  We disagree and will 
vacate the District Court’s orders of dismissal and remand for 
further proceedings.  
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I. BACKGROUND  
 
 A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
 
 The LIA provides that “a locomotive … and its parts 
and appurtenances” must be “in proper condition and safe to 
operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.”1  49 
U.S.C. § 20701(1).  Pursuant to the LIA, the Federal Railroad 
Administration, which acts under the authority of the 
Secretary of Transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 103(a), has 
promulgated regulations on the governing standards of care 
                                              
1 The LIA was previously known as the Boiler 
Inspection Act (“BIA”), which covered only locomotive 
boilers.  Act of Feb. 17, 1911 ch. 103, § 2, 36 Stat. 913, 913-
14.  In 1915, Congress amended the BIA’s scope to cover the 
entire locomotive and its parts and appurtenances.  Act of 
Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 169, § 1, 38 Stat. 1192, 1192.  It provides: 
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a 
locomotive or tender on its railroad line only 
when the locomotive or tender and its parts and 
appurtenances –  
(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate 
without unnecessary danger of personal injury; 
(2) have been inspected as required under this 
chapter and regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of Transportation under this chapter; 
and 
(3) can withstand every test prescribed by the 
Secretary under this chapter. 
49 U.S.C. § 20701. 
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for locomotive equipment, including seats, 49 C.F.R. 
§ 229.119(a) (requiring locomotive seats to “be securely 
mounted and braced”).   
 
 While the LIA and its regulations provide binding 
standards for the suppliers of locomotives and locomotive 
equipment, as well as for railroad companies, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 21302(a)(1); 49 C.F.R. § 229.7(b), the statute does not 
provide a private right of action to employees injured by 
defective equipment.  Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188-
89 (1949).  Instead, an injured employee must bring an action 
against his employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.  The LIA supplements 
the FELA “by imposing on interstate railroads an absolute 
and continuing duty to provide safe equipment” and has the 
“purpose and effect of facilitating employee recover[y].”  
Urie, 337 U.S. at 188-89 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 
 Once an employer has been found liable in a FELA 
action, “it accords with the FELA’s overarching purpose to 
require the employer to bear the burden of identifying other 
responsible parties and demonstrating that some of the costs 
of the injury should be spread to them.”  Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165 (2003); see also Ellison v. 
Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1989) (“FELA’s 
purpose of providing recovery for injured workers is not 
defeated by permitting an employer to recoup its losses in 
part or in full from a third party, when the circumstances and 
state law permit.”).   
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 B.  Factual History2  
 
General Electric (“GE”) built and maintained the 
locomotives at issue in this case, under a contract it had with 
Canadian Pacific.  Pursuant to that agreement, Canadian 
Pacific directed GE to install seats purchased from Knoedler.  
GE complied, and Knoedler “agreed to provide seats of 
suitable quality to prevent seat failures, and suitable for use in 
Canadian Pacific’s locomotives, in the future.”  (App. at 50.) 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, GE and Canadian 
Pacific became aware of problems with seat safety and 
identified defects that were causing the seats to break.  GE 
discussed the nature of the defects and the repair process with 
Knoedler but grew concerned that Knoedler would be unable 
to make the necessary repairs.   To allay that concern, 
Knoedler introduced GE to Durham and “promised that 
Durham had the expertise and capacity to repair the seats on 
Knoedler’s behalf.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6-7.)   
 
GE and Durham subsequently entered into a contract 
under which “Durham agreed to refurbish the Knoedler Seats 
in such a way as to prevent future seat failures.”  (App. at 51.)  
Despite those repair efforts, the seats continued to break and, 
as a consequence, four Canadian Pacific employees were 
                                              
2 Because the District Court dismissed Canadian 
Pacific’s first and second amended complaints in response to 
the Appellees’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept as 
true all facts alleged in Canadian Pacific’s amended 
complaints and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
Canadian Pacific.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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injured.  The railroad eventually settled with its employees 
for a total of approximately $2.7 million.  Thereafter, it 
sought to recoup its losses from Knoedler and Durham.  
 
 C. Procedural History    
 
 Canadian Pacific filed this action against Knoedler and 
Durham on December 16, 2011, asserting claims for 
indemnification, contribution, breach of contract (with 
Canadian Pacific claiming the rights of a third-party 
beneficiary), product liability, and negligence under 
Pennsylvania law.  On March 9, 2012, Knoedler filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint.  In response, the railroad 
filed its First Amended Complaint on March 30, 2012, 
reasserting the same claims but clarifying that the claims were 
based on the Appellees’ violations of the LIA and their 
breach of contractual promises to provide LIA-compliant 
seats.3  Shortly thereafter, Durham and Knoedler filed their 
motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.     
 
 On February 12, 2013, the District Court issued an 
Order and Memorandum Opinion dismissing Canadian 
Pacific’s indemnification and contribution claims with 
prejudice,4 concluding that they were preempted by the LIA.  
                                              
3 Canadian Pacific later withdrew its product liability 
and negligence claims at a hearing held on January 24, 2013.   
4 The District Court’s first Order and Memorandum 
Opinion references only Canadian Pacific’s indemnification 
claims, not its contribution claims.  The parties evidently 
agree that the Court was addressing both indemnification and 
contribution, and it appears to us, based on the District 
Court’s first Order granting the Appellees’ motions to 
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The Court also dismissed the breach-of-contract claims, 
saying that the company had not adequately pled its status as 
a third-party beneficiary.  The Court did, however, allow 
Canadian Pacific to amend its contract claims, and it did so, 
providing additional details about its standing as a third-party 
beneficiary of the contracts.  On August 1, 2013, the Court 
issued a second Order and Memorandum Opinion dismissing 
the breach-of-contract claims, concluding that they were also 
preempted under the LIA.  Canadian Pacific timely appealed 
both of the District Court’s Orders.  
 
II. DISCUSSION5 
 
Canadian Pacific raises two arguments on appeal: first, 
that its indemnification and contribution claims are not 
preempted by the LIA because they are premised on a 
violation of federal standards set by the LIA and 
                                                                                                     
dismiss, that the Court in fact dismissed both the 
indemnification and the contribution claims but simply 
referred to those claims in short as being for indemnification.  
5 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).  Durham had argued that the 
Court did not have personal jurisdiction over it, but because 
the Court dismissed this matter on preemption grounds alone, 
the personal jurisdiction issue was not addressed.  Nothing in 
our disposition of this matter implies any opinion on any 
argument Durham may, upon remand, seek to advance on 
personal jurisdiction.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we exercise plenary review over the 
orders of dismissal.  Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
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accompanying regulations, and, second, that its breach-of-
contract claims are not preempted by the LIA because they 
are premised on a violation of express contractual duties.  We 
address those arguments in turn. 
 
 A. Preemption of Canadian Pacific’s  
  Indemnification and Contribution Claim 
 
Congressional power to preempt state law derives from 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which provides 
that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land … 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  
“Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 
start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of 
the States [are] not to be superseded by … [federal law] 
unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) 
(first, second, and fourth alterations in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “Often Congress does not 
clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-empt 
state laws … .”  Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 
504 (1978).  When that is the case, “courts normally sustain 
local regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts 
with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or 
unless the courts discern from the totality of the 
circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the 
exclusion of the States.”  Id.  At issue here is that latter type 
of exclusion, known as “field preemption.”   
 
 The paramount cases concerning preemption under the 
LIA are Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 272 U.S. 605 
(1926), and Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 132 
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S. Ct. 1261 (2012).  Napier involved challenges to two state 
statutes: a Georgia statute that required fire boxes on 
locomotives to be equipped with an automatic door, and a 
Wisconsin statute that required locomotives to have cab 
curtains.6  Napier, 272 U.S. at 607.  The Supreme Court held 
that the LIA preempted both state statutes because it was 
“intended to occupy the field” pertaining to “the design, the 
construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive 
and tender and of all appurtenances.”  Id. at 611, 613.  Napier 
thus concluded that only the Interstate Commerce 
Commission – the agency then responsible for implementing 
the LIA – had the authority to “set[] the standard” by which a 
locomotive’s “fitness for service shall be determined.”  Id. at 
612.  
 
 The Supreme Court recently revisited the preemptive 
effect of the LIA in Kurns, in which it affirmed our decision 
upholding the dismissal of an action for injuries from 
                                              
6 Both the Georgia and Wisconsin statutes addressed 
health and safety concerns.  The automatic door on fire boxes 
protected firemen from exposure to extreme temperatures 
while stoking the furnace powering the locomotive; it 
protected the firemen’s eyesight by reducing glare from the 
fire (and consequently protected travelers for whom firemen 
kept a lookout when the railroad crossed highways); and it 
protected employees and the train itself in the event of an 
explosion in the fire box.  Napier, 272 U.S. at 609-10.  Cab 
curtains prevented snow from piling into the locomotive cabs 
in the winter months and provided some measure of 
protection against wind and cold temperatures, thereby 
protecting engineers and firemen from discomfort and 
weather-related illnesses.  Id. at 610.  
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defective locomotive parts.  132 S. Ct. at 1270.  The plaintiffs 
in Kurns asserted design-defect and failure-to-warn claims 
against locomotive equipment manufacturers.  Specifically, 
the plaintiffs argued that, under Pennsylvania law, the 
equipment was defectively designed because it contained 
asbestos and that the manufacturers failed to warn them about 
dangers posed by asbestos exposure.  Id. at 1264-65.  The 
Supreme Court rejected those claims, recognizing that they 
were “directed at the equipment of locomotives,” id. at 1269, 
and “f[e]ll within the [preempted] field … as … defined in 
Napier,” id. at 1270.  In so ruling, the Kurns Court also 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the LIA’s pre-emptive 
scope does not extend to state common-law claims, as 
opposed to state legislation or regulation.”  Id. at 1269.  The 
Court noted that Napier’s “categorical conclusion [of LIA 
preemption] admits of no exception for state common-law 
duties and standards of care.”  Id. 
 
 Knoedler and Durham incorrectly read Napier and 
Kurns to say that all state claims regarding the design and 
manufacture of locomotive equipment are preempted by the 
LIA.  But those decisions did not speak so broadly.  They 
were explicit in holding, and only holding, that a state may 
not impose its own duties and standards of care on the 
manufacture and maintenance of locomotive equipment.  See 
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269 (“We therefore conclude that state 
common-law duties and standards of care directed to the 
subject of locomotive equipment are pre-empted by the 
LIA.”); Napier, 272 U.S. at 613 (“[R]equirements by the 
states [regarding locomotive equipment] are precluded, 
however commendable or however different their purpose.”).  
The question left unanswered by Napier and Kurns is whether 
the LIA preempts a state claim that is premised on a violation 
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of the duties and standards of care stemming from the LIA 
itself; in other words, whether a state claim based on a federal 
standard of care is preempted.  We conclude that it is not.  
 
 While there is no Supreme Court authority exactly on 
point, there are plenty of strong hints that such an avenue to 
relief is not foreclosed.  The Court has held in other statutory 
contexts that violations of federal law can be redressed 
through state common-law claims.  See, e.g., Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984) (concluding 
that a state-law remedy based on a violation of the Atomic 
Energy Act was not preempted); see also Abdullah v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that 
“[f]ederal preemption of the standards of care can coexist 
with state and territorial tort remedies” and holding that state 
law remedies for a violation of the Federal Aviation Act were 
not preempted).7  More particularly, in the context of railroad 
                                              
7 Silkwood and Abdullah are instructive even though 
they involved express preemption clauses because the Atomic 
Energy Act and the Federal Aviation Act also occupy their 
particular fields.  Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 240-41, 249 (stating 
with respect to the Atomic Energy Act that “the federal 
government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety 
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the 
states” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367 (“[W]e hold that [the Federal 
Aviation Act] establishes the applicable standards of care in 
the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire 
field from state and territorial regulation.”); see also Altria 
Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (noting that even if 
a statute contains an express preemption clause, “the scope of 
the statute [could still] indicate[] that Congress intended 
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safety laws, state-law claims have been permitted as a means 
to redress federal violations.  For example, in Crane v. Cedar 
Rapids & Iowa City Railway Co., the Supreme Court stated 
that a railroad employee can enforce a violation of the Safety 
Appliance Acts (“SAAs”), 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq., through 
the FELA but that a “nonemployee must look for his remedy 
to a common law action in tort, which is to say that he must 
sue in a state court, in absence of diversity, to implement a 
state cause of action.”8  395 U.S. 164, 166 (1969).  The Court 
                                                                                                     
federal law to occupy the legislative field”).  The Appellees 
argue that Silkwood and Abdullah are inapplicable because, as 
distinguished from the LIA which is silent on the point, 
Congress indicated in the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal 
Aviation Act that state common-law remedies would remain 
available.  Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251 (“[T]he only 
congressional discussion concerning the relationship between 
the Atomic Energy Act and state tort remedies indicates that 
Congress assumed that such remedies would be available.”); 
Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375-76 (noting that the Federal 
Aviation Act’s Savings and Insurance Clauses suggest that 
Congress did not intend to preempt state-law remedies).  
Those cases stand for the larger premise, however, that even 
when Congress has occupied a particular field, state-law 
claims to remedy federal violations are not necessarily 
preempted. 
8 Knoedler argues that Canadian Pacific is “standing in 
the shoes of its employees” and therefore “is not, in a 
technical sense, a ‘non-employee’” able to assert state claims 
under Crane.  (Knoedler Br. at 42.)  But the FELA 
specifically defines who is considered an “employee” and 
Canadian Pacific does not fall within that definition.  See 45 
U.S.C. § 51 (“Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose 
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had in fact reached that same conclusion almost three decades 
earlier in Tipton v. Atchison Tulsa, & Santa Fe Railway Co., 
when it stated that the SAAs “do not give a right of action for 
their breach, but leave the genesis and regulation of such 
action to the law of the states.”  298 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1936).  
Thus, the Court could say a few years later that there is no 
longer any question “as to the power of the state to provide 
whatsoever remedy it may choose for breaches of the [SAAs].  
The federal statutes create the right; the remedy is within the 
state’s discretion.”  Breisch v. Cent. R.R. of N.J., 312 U.S. 
484, 486 (1941). 
 
 Those cases are particularly relevant here, as the SAAs 
are analogous to the LIA in many important respects.  The 
SAAs, like the LIA, regulate locomotive equipment.9  49 
                                                                                                     
duties … shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign 
commerce; or shall, in any way … affect such commerce as 
above set forth shall … be considered as being employed by 
such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as 
entitled to the benefits of this chapter.”).  Furthermore, 
Knoedler’s argument that Canadian Pacific is not an 
employee – so it has no cause of action under the FELA – but 
at the same time is an employee – so it cannot bring state-law 
claims for LIA violations either – sets up a needless no-win 
scenario for railroads.  See infra at pp. 13-14.   
9 The SAAs differ from the LIA in that they expressly 
require certain safety equipment to be used on railroad 
carriers, such as automatic couplers, efficient hand brakes, 
secure ladders with handholds or grab irons, and power 
brakes sufficient to stop the train.  49 U.S.C. § 20302.  The 
LIA, however, more generally requires that a locomotive and 
all its parts and appurtenances be in proper condition, safe to 
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U.S.C. § 20302.  Indeed, the “congressional purpose 
underlying [the LIA] is basically the same as that underlying 
[the SAAs]” – namely that locomotive equipment “be 
employed in active service without unnecessary peril to life or 
limb.”  Urie, 337 U.S. at 190 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Furthermore, neither the LIA nor the SAAs 
provide for private enforcement; instead, railroad employees 
can only enforce those statutes through the FELA.  Urie, 337 
U.S. at 188-89.  “In this view, [the SAAs], together with the 
[LIA], are substantively if not in form amendments to the 
[FELA].”  Id. at 189.    
 
 With respect to preemption, both the LIA and the 
SAAs have broad preemptive scope.  See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 
1267 (“Congress, in enacting the LIA, ‘manifest[ed] the 
intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive 
equipment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Napier, 272 
U.S. at 611)); Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 
57, 60-61 (1934) (“So far as the safety equipment of 
[railroad] vehicles is concerned, [the SAAs] operate to 
exclude state regulation whether consistent, complementary, 
additional, or otherwise.”).  It is true that Napier suggested 
that the scope of the SAAs’ preemption is limited to the 
specific equipment listed in the statute, Napier, 272 U.S. at 
611, but both Crane and Tipton involved a coupler, which is 
expressly covered by the SAAs, Crane, 395 U.S. at 165; 
Tipton, 298 U.S. at 145.  Thus, the full preemptive effect of 
the federal law was operative with respect to that equipment 
and yet the Supreme Court allowed state common-law actions 
                                                                                                     
operate, and adequately inspected and tested.  49 U.S.C. 
§ 20701.  
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to remedy violations of the SAAs.10  Like the LIA, the SAAs 
are silent as to whether state remedies are preempted.11  
Despite that silence, the Supreme Court decided in Crane and 
Tipton that relief under state law was not preempted.12   
                                              
10 Tipton’s approval of Walton v. Southern Pacific Co., 
48 P.2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935), is also telling.  In Walton, 
the California Court of Appeals applied the state’s statute of 
limitations to a wrongful-death claim alleging a violation of 
the LIA, relying in part on cases involving the SAAs.  
Walton, 48 P.2d at 115.  The Supreme Court expressly 
approved that analysis, stating that the Walton court 
“[c]orrectly [held] that the same principles apply in an action 
under [the LIA] as in one under [the SAAs].”  Tipton, 298 
U.S. at 151.   
11 As discussed previously, supra note 7, the Appellees 
discounted Silkwood and Abdullah as being irrelevant in part 
because Congress had indicated with respect to the statutes at 
issue in those cases that state-law remedies would be 
excluded from preemption.  That argument fails with respect 
to the SAAs, further confirming that the Crane line of cases 
are meaningful to the question of the preemptive scope of the 
LIA.  
12 Our dissenting colleague argues that Crane, Breisch, 
and Tipton have little legal force in light of Kurns, and that, to 
the extent they are still viable decisions, they should be read 
as only applying to the SAAs, not the LIA.  Dissent slip op. at 
10-12.  But nothing in the Kurns opinion undercuts or calls 
into question the SAAs line of cases; in fact, the Supreme 
Court did not once mention any of those cases in its decision.  
Especially given the similarities between the LIA and the 
SAAs, if the Supreme Court had intended to cast doubt on the 
17 
 
 Furthermore, congressional intent – which is “the 
ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis,” Abdullah, 181 
F.3d at 365 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) – 
suggests that state law remedies are not preempted under the 
LIA.  Congress’s silence with respect to state-law remedies 
“takes on added significance in light of [its] failure to provide 
any federal remedy” for LIA violations.  Silkwood, 464 U.S. 
at 251 (analyzing Congressional intent regarding the scope of 
preemption under the Atomic Energy Act).  If we were to 
hold that state law claims asserting a violation of the LIA are 
preempted, railroads would be left with no remedy, no matter 
how obvious or egregious the liability of an equipment 
supplier.13  We are not commenting on the culpability of the 
                                                                                                     
vitality of its decisions in the context of the SAAs, it would 
have done so explicitly.  Although the dissent accuses us of 
giving “short shrift to Kurns,”  Dissent slip op. at 7, we are 
faithfully applying the holding of Kurns, instead of 
unnecessarily and, in our view, unwisely expanding its 
language to cover the situation at issue here, as the dissent 
would do.  
13 The dissent contends that it is “crystal clear” that the 
purpose of the LIA was not to protect railroads from lawsuits.  
Dissent slip op. at 2.  But Congress did intend to protect 
railroads’ interests through the LIA, as we explained in our 
opinion in the Kurns case: “The goal of the LIA is to prevent 
the paralyzing effect on railroads from prescription by each 
state of the safety devices obligatory on locomotives that 
would pass through many of them.”  Kurns v. A.W. 
Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. 1261 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The dissent clearly agrees that the LIA does 
have that purpose, given that one of the primary arguments in 
18 
 
Appellees here but are simply noting that Canadian Pacific 
cannot sue them directly under the LIA because the LIA does 
not provide for a private right of action.  Similarly, Canadian 
Pacific cannot sue them under the FELA because that statute 
gives a remedy only to railroad employees.  “It is difficult to 
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all 
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal 
conduct.”  Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.  And yet that would be 
the result if Canadian Pacific’s state law indemnification and 
contribution claims are preempted.14   
                                                                                                     
the dissent is that allowing state-law claims to redress LIA 
violations will threaten national uniformity of railroad safety 
regulations.  In so arguing, however, our colleague is 
essentially saying that the LIA was intended both to protect 
railroads from conflicting state regulations and also to 
purposefully exclude railroads from obtaining judicial 
recourse in a case like this.  We consider that outcome 
inconsistent and untenable. 
14 The Appellees contend that the Ninth Circuit has 
rejected the argument that the lack of a legal remedy should 
weigh in an analysis of the preemptive effect of the LIA.  
That court said in Law v. General Motors Corp., that, 
“[b]ecause railroad operators are liable for any injuries 
suffered by their employees, they would not buy locomotives, 
cars and other equipment that fall short of [LIA] standards.”  
114 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1997).  Knoedler relies on that to 
argue that, if Canadian Pacific believes that Knoedler sells a 
defective product, “it can see that justice is done by not 
buying equipment from Knoedler or using a locomotive with 
a Knoedler component again.”  (Knoedler Br. at 34.)  We 
decline to adopt that analysis.  While market forces may have 
a long-term impact on the conduct of equipment 
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 There are other railroad-related cases in which the 
Supreme Court has approved, in fact encouraged, the use of 
state-law claims to redress violations of federal law.  For 
example, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, the 
Court declined to allow the defendant railroad to have FELA 
damages apportioned to third-party tortfeasors who 
contributed to plaintiffs’ asbestos-related injuries.  538 U.S. at 
143.  The problem was not with making the third-party 
tortfeasors share the load.  The problem was with making that 
sharing a matter of dispute in the FELA action, so that the 
injured employee had to engage in the fight over apportioning 
fault.  The Supreme Court stated that “[o]nce an employer has 
been adjudged negligent … it accords with the FELA’s 
overarching purpose to require the employer to bear the 
burden of identifying other responsible parties and 
demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury should be 
spread to them.”  Id. at 165.  In so concluding, the Court 
relied on the “numerous FELA decisions … recognizing that 
FELA defendants may bring indemnification and contribution 
actions against third parties under otherwise applicable state 
or federal law.”  Id. at 162.   
 
 One of those FELA decisions was Engvall v. Soo Line 
Railroad Co., in which the Supreme Court of Minnesota held 
that, in circumstances nearly identical to those here, state-law 
claims redressing violations of the LIA are not preempted.  
See 632 N.W.2d 560, 571 (Minn. 2001) (holding that a 
                                                                                                     
manufacturers, they do not provide a remedy for losses 
already incurred because of the violations of governing 
standards of care.  If Congress intended to foreclose all legal 
remedies available to railroad companies seeking to recoup 
FELA damages, it likely would have said so plainly. 
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railroad’s third-party complaint seeking contribution and/or 
indemnification from an equipment manufacturer to recoup 
FELA losses was not preempted because the railroad’s claims 
were based on violations of the LIA, not state standards).  The 
District Court rejected Engvall, noting that it has been 
criticized by other courts.15  But the one Court we must attend 
to most carefully, the Supreme Court, favorably cited Engvall 
twice in Ayers as an example of a case where a railroad was 
able to recoup its FELA losses through state-law 
indemnification and contribution claims.  Ayers, 538 U.S. at 
162 n.21, 164 n.23.   
                                              
15 The District Court also relies on a number of cases 
reaching a conclusion arguably at odds with Engvall, but 
those cases are distinguishable because they are either actions 
by railroad employees who already had a remedy under the 
FELA, or they involved causes of action asserting state 
standards of care, as opposed to federal standards of care.  See 
Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 4:07CV00522BSM, 
2009 WL 129916, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 20, 2009) (“[Union 
Pacific] seeks contribution and indemnification from Seats 
based on theories of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict 
liability.”); Bonner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV03-134-S-
MHW, 2005 WL 1593635, at *10 (D. Idaho 2005) 
(“Nowhere in this statement is the Court able to discern an 
argument that GM-EMD violated the federal standard 
imposed by LIA.”); Roth v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 1054, 1063-64 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (“Roth was a 
railroad employee, and here a federal cause of action under 
FELA exists.”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Motive Equip., Inc., 
714 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting Union 
Pacific’s assertion that the manufacturer was liable for 
negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranties). 
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 Furthermore, the policy behind preemption does not 
support excluding the state-law claims at issue here.  The 
primary rationale for federal preemption in the field of 
railroad safety regulation is national uniformity.  Preemption 
allows railroad carriers to abide by a single set of national 
equipment regulations, instead of having to meet different 
standards and, potentially, to change equipment when a train 
crosses state lines.  Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 
392, 398 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. 
1261 (“The goal of the LIA is to prevent the paralyzing effect 
on railroads from prescription by each state of the safety 
devices obligatory on locomotives that would pass through 
many of them.”  (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  It is therefore clear why Napier and Kurns did not 
allow states to impose their own standards of care – either 
through state regulations or through state tort liability – with 
respect to locomotive equipment.  But the enforcement under 
state law of a federal standard of care does not undermine 
national uniformity because it does not impose conflicting 
regulations that a railroad must heed during interstate travel.  
 
 Congress itself has indicated that the goal of uniform 
railroad operating standards is not undermined when state-law 
claims are used to enforce federal law.  For example, 
Congress explicitly stated in the Federal Railroad Safety Act 
that state law claims seeking damages for federal violations 
are not preempted.  49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1).  If Congress 
thought state claims alleging a failure to comply with federal 
railroad safety laws would jeopardize uniformity, then it 
would have declared the elimination rather than the saving of 
such claims.  And the Federal Railroad Administration – the 
agency responsible for implementing the LIA as well as the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act – has confirmed that state-law 
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claims can be used to enforce a federal standard of care.  See 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of 
Cab Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives; Final Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 1180, 1208 (Jan. 8, 2010) (“[The Federal Railroad 
Administration] was careful to convey that Federal 
preemption under [the Federal Railroad Safety Act] applied to 
standards of care under State law – as opposed to claims 
(causes of action) under State law.  They are different.”).  It is 
also noteworthy that state courts already interpret the LIA 
because FELA claims based on violations of the LIA that are 
filed in state courts cannot be removed to federal court.16  28 
U.S.C. § 1445(a).   
 
                                              
 16 That fact alone negates the dissent’s contention that 
allowing state-law remedies for LIA violations poses a 
significant threat to national uniformity, Dissent slip op. at 4-
6.  Because state courts are already interpreting the LIA, any 
danger to uniformity, to the extent it can be called a danger, is 
already present.  There is always a possibility that, at the 
margins, state courts will differ in their interpretations of the 
federal standard of care, but the Supreme Court has not 
expressed concern with that possibility and neither do we.  
Further, the hypothetical posed by the dissent – in which a 
person struck by a train could sue a railroad under strict 
liability in one state but not in another, Dissent slip op. at 4-5 
– does not address differing standards of care.  It only 
concerns whether a wanderer could sue under the LIA.  It 
does not explain how differing state laws that affect who may 
sue would result in differing substantive standards directed at 
railroads.   
 
23 
 
 In light of the foregoing, the District Court erred in 
holding that Canadian Pacific’s indemnification and 
contribution claims are preempted.   
 
B.  Preemption of Canadian Pacific’s Breach-of-
 Contract Claims  
 
 Canadian Pacific’s breach-of-contract claims also 
should have survived the motions to dismiss.  As noted 
earlier, the railroad argues that both Knoedler and Durham 
breached their contractual obligations to supply GE with LIA-
compliant seats.  Claiming the status of a third-party 
beneficiary to those contracts, Canadian Pacific seeks relief 
for those breaches.   
 
 Much of the analysis described above with respect to 
the indemnification and contribution claims also applies to 
the breach-of-contract claims.  Just as there is room for state 
tort remedies, there is room for state contract remedies 
associated with the federal standards embodied in the LIA.  
The breach-of-contract claims do not require Knoedler or 
Durham to comply with a state duty or standard of care.  
Instead, Canadian Pacific seeks to enforce contractual 
provisions that call for compliance with federal law.  
Enforcing the contracts would therefore not detrimentally 
affect national uniformity of railroad operating standards.  
Uniformity is to be expected because it is in the interest of the 
contracting parties.  Having one set of national regulations to 
follow is important both to railroads and to equipment 
suppliers for the obvious reason that neither wants to deal 
with a multiplicity of possibly conflicting state standards.  
Therefore, in delineating their duties under a contract, the 
railroads and their suppliers will be fully motivated to ensure 
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that all provisions regarding equipment design and 
manufacture are based on a uniform federal standard of care.   
 
 But even if the LIA did preempt Canadian Pacific’s 
indemnification and contribution claims, it would not follow 
that the LIA preempts the breach-of-contract claims, because 
breach-of-contract claims involve voluntarily assumed duties 
as opposed to duties imposed by state law.17  “[W]hen a party 
to a contract voluntarily assumes an obligation to proceed 
under certain state laws, traditional preemption doctrine does 
not apply to shield a party from liability for breach of that 
                                              
17 Knoedler argues that Canadian Pacific is 
impermissibly attempting to circumvent the absence of a 
private right of action in the LIA by restating its tort claims as 
breach-of-contract claims.  Knoedler relies on Astra USA, Inc. 
v. Santa Clara County, in which the Supreme Court held that 
plaintiffs could not sue on a form contract implementing a 
statute when the statute itself provided no private right of 
action.  131 S. Ct. 1342, 1345 (2011) (applying § 340B of the 
Public Health Services Act, which imposes ceilings on prices 
drug manufacturers may charge for medications sold to 
healthcare facilities).  But, as discussed above, the Supreme 
Court in Crane allowed enforcement of the SAAs through 
state-law claims even when there was no private right of 
action.  See supra pp. 10-12 (discussing Crane and the 
SAAs).  Furthermore, Astra is distinguishable as it involved 
“form agreements” that “simply incorporate[d] statutory 
obligations and record[ed] the manufacturers’ agreement to 
abide by them” but “contain[ed] no negotiable terms.”  Id. at 
1348.  Here, the contracts at issue involved negotiated duties 
voluntarily assumed by the parties that, Canadian Pacific 
alleges, explicitly required LIA-compliant seats.   
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agreement.”  Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 
315, 326 (4th Cir. 2012).  There is a salutary “you’ve made 
your own bed, now lie in it” quality to several cases from the 
Supreme Court that emphasize the importance of voluntarily 
assumed contractual obligations.  See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995) (“We do not read the 
[Airline Deregulation Act]’s preemption clause … to shelter 
airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed 
obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline’s 
alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”); 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 526 (plurality opinion) (holding that a 
breach-of-warranty claim was not preempted by the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act because “a common-
law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily 
undertaken should not be regarded as a requirement … 
imposed under State law” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 
134 S. Ct. 1422, 1432-33 (2014) (holding that the Airline 
Deregulation Act preempted claims alleging breach of an 
implied covenant because, under the controlling state law, 
parties could not contract out of such covenants – and thus 
they were “regarded as state-imposed” – but noting that if a 
state permitted parties to voluntarily surrender protections 
from covenants, then those claims would “escape pre-
emption”).   
 
 That some of those cases involved express preemption 
as opposed to field preemption does not change the analysis.  
The same principle applies, regardless of the breadth of 
preemption: duties voluntarily undertaken cannot be 
considered as “state imposed.”  Because Kurns concluded 
only that “state common-law duties and standards of care” are 
preempted by the LIA, Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269, – and not 
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voluntary contractual duties – even the broad field 
preemption of the LIA does not rule out Canadian Pacific’s 
breach-of-contract claims.18     
 
 To hold that the LIA preempts all breach-of-contract 
claims would allow, and perhaps encourage, manufacturers to 
make grand contractual promises to obtain a deal and then 
breach their duties with impunity.  Knoedler’s and Durham’s 
only response to the perverse incentives inherent in their 
arguments is a shoulder shrug.  “Let the market sort things 
out,” they say.  As counsel for Durham put it at oral 
argument, “the people who are being put upon by this lack of 
remedy are not your average consumers; they are railroads, in 
this case a huge railroad, with incredible economic power to 
buy or not buy from various people.”  (Oral Arg. at 23:25-
43.)  But even the rich and powerful are entitled to the rule of 
law, and we see no reason to believe that Congress meant for 
Darwinian attrition to replace legal remedies. 
                                              
18 The District Court erroneously relied on cases 
holding that breach-of-contract claims were preempted under 
the Carmack Amendment.  The Carmack Amendment is a 
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme pertaining to 
interstate carrier liability for loss or damage to shipments.  
Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. 
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 762 F.3d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“Congress first comprehensively addressed interstate 
carrier liability in the Carmack Amendment … .”).  Those 
cases are readily distinguishable because, unlike the LIA, the 
Carmack Amendment provides a federal private right of 
action.  Id. (“Shippers may bring a federal private cause of 
action directly under the Carmack Amendment against a 
carrier for damages.”).   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Canadian Pacific’s state law claims of indemnification 
and contribution based on the LIA are not preempted, nor are 
its breach-of-contract claims.  We will therefore vacate the 
District Court’s Orders dismissing the First and Second 
Amended Complaints and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.    
DELAWARE & HUDSON RAILWAY COMPANY, INC., et al. v. 
KNOEDLER MANUFACTURERS, INC., et al., No. 13-3678 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 This is a field preemption case arising under the 
Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA). Just two years ago the 
Supreme Court had occasion to consider and clarify the LIA’s 
preemptive scope in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 
132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012). There, the Court held that state common 
law tort claims related to railroad safety are preempted by the 
LIA. This appeal requires us to decide whether the LIA’s broad 
preemptive scope extends to state law tort and breach of contract 
claims based on federal standards. The question defies an easy 
answer, but on balance, I read Kurns to indicate that the LIA 
preempts all state law causes of action, even those based on 
federal standards of care. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
Our decision turns largely on how we read Kurns, which 
teaches that the LIA preempts a large swath of state law claims 
related to railroad safety (all those based on duties derived from 
state common law). Should we, in this case, take the next logical 
step on the path Kurns has laid out and hold that the LIA 
preempts all state law claims related to railroad safety, 
regardless of whether those claims are based on state- or federal-
law duties? Or should we depart from that path to carve out an 
exception for state common law claims based on federal 
standards?  
I would take the next logical step and hold that the LIA 
preempts all state law claims in the field of railroad safety, 
including those at issue in this appeal, for three reasons. First, 
doing so is consistent with the LIA’s simple but important 
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purpose—protecting railroad workers. Second, neither Kurns 
nor the case upon which it principally relies, Napier v. Atlantic 
Coast Line Railroad, 272 U.S. 605 (1926)), suggests that there 
is an exception to the LIA’s otherwise broad preemptive scope 
for state law causes of action based on federal standards of care. 
Finally, the majority’s decision to the contrary strips Kurns of 
much of its practical significance while simultaneously 
threatening national uniformity in railroad law.  
A 
 Congressional purpose suggests that state law causes of 
action based on federal locomotive safety standards are within 
the field preempted by the LIA. “[T]he prime purpose of the 
[LIA] was the protection of railroad employees and perhaps also 
of passengers and the public at large from injury due to 
industrial accident.” Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 191 
(1949) (internal citation omitted). And whatever ancillary 
purposes the LIA is intended to serve, one thing is crystal clear: 
protecting railroads from lawsuits isn’t one of them. In fact, 
Congress intended to protect employees and other vulnerable 
parties from railroads and their potentially subpar safety 
measures. Thus, unlike my colleagues, see Maj. Typescript at 
17, I’m neither surprised nor troubled by the notion that the LIA 
would leave railroads like Canadian Pacific with no remedy for 
injuries such as those alleged here. And the absence of a remedy 
in no way reduces the incentives railroads have to ensure that 
their locomotives “are in proper condition and safe to operate,” 
and to closely inspect locomotive parts (like the defective seats 
that led to this case) for possible defects, see 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20701—in fact, it incentivizes railroads to be even more 
careful when inspecting their locomotives for safety hazards, 
since they cannot pass on LIA liability to others. That such 
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increased safety would come at the expense of highly regulated 
railroads is no surprise, and should not influence our decision.1 
 In addition, Congress knew when it enacted the LIA 
(originally known as the Boiler Inspection Act) that the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., 
provided a remedy for employees but not for railroads.2 For over 
90 years, Congress has not provided railroads a remedy for 
injuries they suffer as a result of LIA violations. That failure is 
unsurprising, consistent as it is with the LIA’s purpose—a 
purpose which is furthered by the role of FELA in providing a 
remedy to injured railroad workers.  
 Second, Kurns and Napier in no way suggest that the 
LIA’s broad preemptive scope includes a tacit exception for 
railroads to recoup FELA damages in state law causes of action 
based on federal standards of care. Instead, Napier held merely 
that the LIA “was intended to occupy the field,” citing the 
“broad scope of the authority conferred upon the [regulatory 
body charged with promulgating regulations under the LIA]” as 
evidence of that preemption. 272 U.S. at 613. And Kurns 
teaches that there is “no exception” in that preempted field for 
                                                 
1 The majority speculates that “[i]f Congress intended 
to foreclose all legal remedies available to railroad companies 
seeking to recoup FELA damages, it likely would have said so 
plainly.” Maj. Typescript at 19 n.14. In light of the LIA’s 
purpose, it is even more likely that if Congress did not intend 
for railroads to shoulder the entire LIA regulatory burden, it 
would have said so plainly. 
2 The Boiler Inspection Act, which was passed after 
FELA, worked so closely with FELA that the Court called it 
“substantively if not in form [an] amendment[] to the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act.” Urie, 337 U.S. at 189. 
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state standards of care. 132 S. Ct. at 1269. Neither case provides 
any reason to believe that a remedy lies outside of FELA for 
non-employees injured as a result of LIA violations. 
 Finally, I disagree with my colleagues that the primary 
goal of preemption—national uniformity—would not be 
undermined by allowing state law causes of action using 
standards of care derived from the LIA. See Maj. Typescript at 
21–22. Instead, I am convinced that allowing such causes of 
action would threaten uniformity significantly while at the same 
time undercutting the Court’s decision in Kurns. To understand 
why, consider the text of the LIA, under which locomotives and 
locomotive parts and appurtenances must be “in proper 
condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of 
personal injury.” 49 U.S.C. § 20701(1). These requirements are 
amorphous, to say the least. What is “proper condition?” What is 
“safe to operate?” Whose “unnecessary danger of personal 
injury” is to be considered? The LIA does not answer these 
questions, and it would seem obvious that hundreds of state and 
federal courts will answer them in multifarious ways. And in 
doing so, they will undermine uniformity in the national 
regulatory scheme.  
  A simple example illustrates the disparate results today’s 
decision will propagate: A person crossing a track is struck by a 
train through no fault of the train operator. No workers or 
passengers on the train are injured. The train is equipped with 
industry-standard braking equipment, but the injured person 
claims that a better brake design could and should have been 
used. The railroad is sued under a strict liability theory citing the 
LIA’s “proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary 
danger of personal injury” language as the applicable standard 
that the railroad failed to meet. But does the injured person even 
have standing to sue under the LIA? A court deciding this 
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question would turn to state law to determine whether only a 
worker or passenger of a railroad could sue under such a theory, 
and state law will often differ on this question.3 Answering that 
question will affect the court’s interpretation of the LIA’s 
substantive standard of care, as it directly pertains to whose 
“unnecessary danger of personal injury” is relevant under the 
federal standard. Railroads will be subject to different rules in 
various states, and will have to adapt their equipment and 
policies to each state’s decision regarding which parties could 
sue under the LIA. This is an untenable result. 
 These are the types of legal interpretations that state 
courts make every day in evaluating causes of action in various 
factual contexts. Negligence, for example, is a failure to 
“exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.” 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 3 
(2010). This standard, like the standard of care in the LIA, is 
                                                 
3 Some states follow the Third Restatement of Torts, 
which “does not limit a strict liability cause of action to the 
‘user or consumer,’ and broadly permits any person harmed 
by a defective product to recover in strict liability.” Berrier v. 
Simplicity Mfg., Inc. 563 F.3d 38, 54 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting 
that Wisconsin, California, Mississippi, Arizona, Missouri, 
Michigan, Iowa, Alabama, Utah, and Vermont do so). But 
other states have declined to adopt the Third Restatement, and 
might limit recovery only to a consumer or user of the 
product—in this case, a worker or passenger of the train. See, 
e.g., Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 2014 WL 6474923, at *62 
(Pa. Nov. 19, 2014) (declining to adopt the Third 
Restatement’s approach to strict liability, despite the Third 
Circuit’s prediction that it would do so in Berrier, 563 F.3d at 
53). 
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general by design. To ascertain its meaning in a given context, 
trial courts consider a variety of factors, not the least of which 
may include “countervailing principle[s] or polic[ies].” Id. at 
§ 7. State courts must and will construe the LIA’s required 
duties just as they normally would construe standards of care in 
other state law contexts—that is, by considering ordinary state 
policy concerns. 
In doing so, state courts will necessarily inject state law 
policies into what is, according to the majority, an LIA-derived 
duty. This is exactly what Kurns prohibits. Kurns’s ban on state 
law standards of care is uncontroverted, yet actions based on 
those standards will implicitly be permitted under our decision 
today, which strips Kurns of much (if not all) of its effect. It 
does so because the LIA’s federal standard of care is so broad 
that most state law claimants who would otherwise be barred by 
Kurns will be able to avoid that bar by cloaking their state law 
claims in the garb of the LIA. Kurns should not be gutted in this 
manner.4  
In sum, because the LIA protects workers and not 
railroads, because the Supreme Court has not so much as hinted 
at an exception for federal standards of care in the LIA’s broad 
                                                 
4 The majority correctly notes that state courts already 
interpret the LIA through FELA actions filed in state court. 
But that fact is immaterial to the question presented in this 
appeal because we all agree that Congress, by enacting FELA, 
has eschewed national uniformity in favor of providing a 
remedy to injured railroad workers who sue their employers. 
Kurns demonstrates that this policy-based exception to 
national uniformity does not extend even to cases in which 
railroad workers sue non-employers—let alone cases, like this 
one, in which railroads sue under the LIA.  
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preemptive scope, and because doing so would seriously 
undermine national uniformity, I would hold that the LIA 
preempts state law causes action falling within the preempted 
field, even when they are based on federal standards of care.  
II 
After giving short shrift to Kurns, a recent Supreme 
Court decision that arises under the LIA, the majority relies on 
older cases that arise under other federal laws. See Maj. 
Typescript at 12–16. Although these decisions have some 
relevance to this appeal, they involve laws that differ in 
meaningful ways from the LIA. Perhaps even more significant is 
the fact that they were decided before Kurns, so they are devoid 
of the Court’s reasoning in its most recent exposition of LIA 
preemption. 
 First, the majority leans on Abdullah v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999), and Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), for the proposition 
that “in other statutory contexts . . . violations of federal law can 
be redressed through state common-law claims.” Maj. 
Typescript at 12. My colleagues are correct that in some 
contexts the Supreme Court has allowed violations of federal 
law to be redressed through state law causes of action. But there 
are critical differences between those contexts and the LIA, and 
Abdullah evinces a prominent difference. The law interpreted in 
that case, the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), preempted the field 
of aviation safety but also included a savings clause that 
explicitly preserved “other remedies provided by law,” including 
state law claims. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 374–75. The LIA 
doesn’t have a savings clause. The majority suggests that the 
savings clause is unimportant because Abdullah “stands for the 
larger premise . . . that even when Congress has occupied a 
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particular field, state-law claims to remedy federal violations are 
not necessarily preempted.” Maj. Typescript at 12–13 n.7. But if 
state law claims were permissible in any event, why did the 
FAA include a savings clause? Because the savings clause does 
no work under this interpretation, the majority violates the canon 
against superfluity, see Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 
(2014); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(1955) (citing Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 
U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). The better view is that the LIA’s lack of 
a savings clause is a meaningful difference between it and the 
FAA.  
 Silkwood involves the Atomic Energy Act, a federal law 
that, unlike the LIA, is not accompanied by a comprehensive 
federal remedial scheme. 464 U.S. at 241. As the majority 
recognizes, even in the absence of a savings clause in the 
Atomic Energy Act, Congress indicated that it assumed state tort 
remedies would remain available within the preempted field. As 
the Court noted, “there [was] no indication that Congress even 
seriously considered precluding the use of such remedies” in 
passing the law. Id. at 251. In contrast, the LIA evidences no 
desire by Congress to permit state law remedies to remain 
available within the locomotive safety field. In fact, the 
existence of a federal remedial statute (FELA) is a strong 
indication that those remedies did not remain available. FELA 
provides a remedy for LIA violations just as state law claims did 
for the Atomic Energy Act. If there were a federal remedial 
statute like FELA for the Atomic Energy Act, the Silkwood 
Court would have had no reason to find it “difficult to believe 
that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of 
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.” Silkwood, 
464 U.S. at 251.  
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 The Silkwood Court’s assumption that Congress would 
not leave persons injured by violations of the Atomic Energy 
Act without a remedy is consistent with that Act’s purpose of 
protecting the public from an emerging and potentially 
dangerous form of energy while at the same time promoting the 
development of the atomic energy industry. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2012. It would make little sense to pass a law “in order to 
protect the public,” while depriving the public of a way to 
enforce that protection. Id. § 2012(i). Conversely, it makes 
perfect sense that Congress did not intend to permit private 
actions in the particular context presented by this case: a railroad 
attempting to recover under the LIA. Unlike the Silkwood 
plaintiff (the administrator of the estate of an employee of an 
atomic energy company), a railroad like Canadian Pacific is 
outside the protective scope of the LIA. “[T]he prime purpose of 
the [LIA] was the protection of railroad employees . . . .” Urie, 
337 U.S. at 191. FELA already provides a remedy for railroad 
employees who suffer injury as a result of LIA violations; thus, 
Congress could—and, in my view, did—foreclose state law 
causes of action based on LIA violations with nary a concern 
about leaving railroad workers without a remedy. 
  The cases dealing with the Safety Appliance Acts 
(Appliance Acts)—Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway 
Co., 395 U.S. 164 (1969); Breisch v. Central Railroad of New 
Jersey, 312 U.S. 484 (1941); and Tipton v. Atchison, Tulsa & 
Santa Fe Railway Co., 298 U.S. 141 (1936)—are more germane 
to this appeal because there are some superficial similarities 
between the Appliance Acts and the LIA. As the majority points 
out, both the Appliance Acts and the LIA regulate locomotive 
equipment, and neither provides for private enforcement—
instead, injured employees must seek a remedy under FELA, 
and there is no statutory remedy for non-employees. Maj. 
10 
 
Typescript at 15. And, as with the LIA, the Appliance Acts 
preempt their field of regulation and Congress gave no explicit 
indication that state law causes of action should remain available 
under them, yet nonemployees may seek redress for violations of 
the Appliance Acts via common law causes of action. Crane, 
395 U.S. at 166.  
 But rote application of these precedents to this appeal 
overlooks the importance of the Supreme Court’s more recent 
and more relevant decision in Kurns. The effect of the 
Appliance Acts cases on the LIA is at least questionable after 
Kurns. Crane, decided 45 years ago, held that the defense of 
contributory negligence in an Appliance Act suit was not 
preempted. 395 U.S. at 167. Contributory negligence, a standard 
feature of common law negligence actions, is defined by state 
common law. Yet Kurns prohibits the use of a state law standard 
of care in a case related to railroad safety. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 
1269. Given the Court’s clear statement that state law has no 
place in defining duties in the field of railroad safety, I think it 
unlikely the Court would permit a state standard of care to be 
used, as Crane allows, as part of an affirmative defense. Id. 
(noting that the “categorical conclusion” that the LIA preempts 
the field of locomotive safety “admits of no exception for state 
common-law duties and standards of care”). In my view, then, if 
Crane retains vitality after Kurns, it must be read to apply only 
to the Appliance Acts, and not to the LIA. 
 Breisch and Tipton, the other Appliance Acts cases cited 
by the majority, raise a similar concern. Both cases recognize 
that the Appliance Acts “leave the genesis and regulation of 
[rights of action based on breach of the Appliance Acts] to the 
law of the states.” Tipton, 298 U.S. at 148; accord Breisch, 312 
U.S. at 486. As Tipton noted, the Appliance Acts created an 
“absolute duty” for employers—if employers fall below that 
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statutory standard of care, they are negligent under state law. 
298 U.S. at 146. But under Tipton, state law standards of care 
may still play a significant (and, under Kurns, prohibited) role: 
although a railroad’s violation of the Appliance Acts means that 
it is negligent, a railroad’s compliance with the Appliance Acts 
does not mean that it is not negligent. See Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 16 (2010) 
(“[C]ompliance with a pertinent statute, while evidence of 
nonnegligence, does not preclude a finding that the actor is 
negligent . . . for failing to adopt precautions in addition to those 
mandated by the statute.”). Thus, under Tipton and Breisch, a 
particularly safety-conscious state could hold railroads to a more 
stringent standard of care than that mandated in the Appliance 
Acts—a “potent method of governing conduct and controlling 
policy,” that Kurns plainly precludes. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269 
(quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 
236, 247 (1959)). Here again, although the Appliance Acts and 
the LIA share some traits, Kurns illustrates that cases construing 
the Appliance Acts do not necessarily apply in the LIA context. 
 Aside from the lack of a case analogous to Kurns that 
arises under the Appliance Acts, those Acts differ from the LIA 
in another critical way. As the majority acknowledges, the 
Appliance Acts contain some very specific requirements for 
railroads—“certain safety equipment [must] be used on railroad 
carriers, such as automatic couplers, efficient hand brakes, 
secure ladders with handholds or grab irons, and power brakes 
sufficient to stop the train.” Maj. Typescript at 14 n.9 (citing 49 
U.S.C. § 20302). The LIA, by contrast, merely requires that 
trains and their constituent parts be “in proper condition and safe 
to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.” The 
Appliance Acts’ veritable laundry list of requirements allows a 
court to decide a case based on them without reference to 
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common law, and with little interpretive discretion—either a 
train is equipped with the mandated parts, or it is not. The LIA’s 
broad scope, as I noted in Part I, offers no such clear guidance, 
and will require courts to give meaning to its general 
instructions. State courts will do so by filling in the gaps with 
multifarious state policies and rules, contrary to the teaching of 
Kurns.  
III 
 The LIA’s preemptive scope is broad—perhaps unusually 
broad, given recent Supreme Court preemption cases. See 
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Viewed 
through the lens of modern preemption law, Napier is an 
anachronism.”). But we must follow the law as it specifically 
pertains to the LIA, and Kurns is the most germane 
pronouncement on the subject. I recognize that my view would 
leave Canadian Pacific, and other injured non-employees, 
without a remedy for LIA violations. “But it is for Congress to 
amend the statute to prevent such injustice. It is not permitted 
the Court to rewrite the statute.” Crane, 395 U.S. at 167. The 
absence of a remedy under the LIA may be a tough pill for 
railroads to swallow, but it is the one I believe Congress 
prescribed. With respect, I dissent. 
